Jenkins 未授权远程代码执行漏洞(CVE-2017-1000353)

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漏洞概要

Jenkins 未授权远程代码执行漏洞, 允许攻击者将序列化的Java SignedObject对象传输给Jenkins CLI处理，反序列化ObjectInputStream作为Command对象，这将绕过基于黑名单的保护机制, 导致代码执行。

漏洞触发执行流程

SSD的报告披露了完整的漏洞细节，作为才学JAVA的我来说，看完这份报告，依旧不清楚具体的执行流程，因此有了下文，梳理漏洞触发的具体执行流程。

触发jenkins反序列化导致代码执行的漏洞发生在使用HTTP协议实现双向通信通道的代码中，Jenkins利用此通道来接收命令。大致流程如下图:

如何建立双向Channel

基于HTTP建立双向Channel的入口函数位于jenkins-2.46.1/core/src/main/java/hudson/cli/CLIAction.java文件中

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@Extension @Symbol("cli")
@Restricted(NoExternalUse.class)
public class CLIAction implements UnprotectedRootAction, StaplerProxy {

    private transient final Map<UUID,FullDuplexHttpChannel> duplexChannels = new HashMap<UUID, FullDuplexHttpChannel>();

	 ......

    @Override
    public Object getTarget() {
        StaplerRequest req = Stapler.getCurrentRequest();
        if (req.getRestOfPath().length()==0 && "POST".equals(req.getMethod())) {
            // CLI connection request
            throw new CliEndpointResponse();
        } else {
            return this;
        }
    }

    private class CliEndpointResponse extends HttpResponseException {
        @Override
        public void generateResponse(StaplerRequest req, StaplerResponse rsp, Object node) throws IOException, ServletException {
            try {
                // do not require any permission to establish a CLI connection
                // the actual authentication for the connecting Channel is done by CLICommand

                UUID uuid = UUID.fromString(req.getHeader("Session"));
                rsp.setHeader("Hudson-Duplex",""); // set the header so that the client would know

                FullDuplexHttpChannel server;
                if(req.getHeader("Side").equals("download")) {
                    duplexChannels.put(uuid,server=new FullDuplexHttpChannel(uuid, !Jenkins.getActiveInstance().hasPermission(Jenkins.ADMINISTER)) {
                        @Override
                        protected void main(Channel channel) throws IOException, InterruptedException {
                            // capture the identity given by the transport, since this can be useful for SecurityRealm.createCliAuthenticator()
                            channel.setProperty(CLICommand.TRANSPORT_AUTHENTICATION, Jenkins.getAuthentication());
                            channel.setProperty(CliEntryPoint.class.getName(),new CliManagerImpl(channel));
                        }
                    });
                    try {
                        server.download(req,rsp);
                    } finally {
                        duplexChannels.remove(uuid);
                    }
                } else {
                    duplexChannels.get(uuid).upload(req,rsp);
                }
            } catch (InterruptedException e) {
                throw new IOException(e);
            }
        }
    }
}

从上述代码可知，建立一对双向通道(download/upload), 需要发送两次POST请求，根据请求头Session字段的值uuid识别不同的双向通道，Side字段的值识别download或upload通道，请求发送的顺序是先发送download请求再发送upload请求，跟进download函数(/Users/js/IdeaProjects/vulnhub/jenkins-2.46.1/core/src/main/java/hudson/model/FullDuplexHttpChannel.java), 当服务器收到download请求时会阻塞请求，等待upload请求，收到upload请求后，新建Channel对象处理upload请求和返回响应，代码如下:

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public synchronized void download(StaplerRequest req, StaplerResponse rsp) throws InterruptedException, IOException {
		......

       {// wait until we have the other channel
           long end = System.currentTimeMillis() + CONNECTION_TIMEOUT;
           while (upload == null && System.currentTimeMillis()<end)
               wait(1000);

           if (upload==null)
               throw new IOException("HTTP full-duplex channel timeout: "+uuid);
       }

       try {
           channel = new Channel("HTTP full-duplex channel " + uuid,
                   Computer.threadPoolForRemoting, Mode.BINARY, upload, out, null, restricted);
	     ......
       } finally {
           // publish that we are done
           completed=true;
           notify();
       }
   }

 public synchronized void upload(StaplerRequest req, StaplerResponse rsp) throws InterruptedException, IOException {
       rsp.setStatus(HttpServletResponse.SC_OK);
       InputStream in = req.getInputStream();
       if(DIY_CHUNKING)    in = new ChunkedInputStream(in);

       // publish the upload channel
       upload = in;
       notify();

       // wait until we are done
       while (!completed)
           wait();
   }

以上就是建立双向通道的基本过程。

Channel对象启动ReaderThread

upload请求作为输入流实例化Channel对象(~/.m2/repository/org/jenkins-ci/main/remoting/3.7/remoting-3.7-sources.jar!/hudson/remoting/Channel.java), Channel类的构造链比较繁琐如下图，

最终调用的构造方法为Channel(ChannelBuilder settings, CommandTransport transport), 该构造方法的transport参数，由ChannelBuilder类的negotiate()方法获得。

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protected CommandTransport negotiate(final InputStream is, final OutputStream os) throws IOException {
		  ......
        {// read the input until we hit preamble
            Mode[] modes={Mode.BINARY,Mode.TEXT};
            byte[][] preambles = new byte[][]{Mode.BINARY.preamble, Mode.TEXT.preamble, Capability.PREAMBLE};
            int[] ptr=new int[3];
            Capability cap = new Capability(0); // remote capacity that we obtained. If we don't hear from remote, assume no capability

            while(true) {
                int ch = is.read();
                ......
                for(int i=0;i<preambles.length;i++) {
                    byte[] preamble = preambles[i];
                    if(preamble[ptr[i]]==ch) {
                        if(++ptr[i]==preamble.length) {
                            switch (i) {
                            case 0:
                            case 1:
                                ......
                                return makeTransport(is, os, mode, cap);
                            case 2:
                                cap = Capability.read(is);

negotiate()会检查输入(upload请求)的前导码, 所有发往Jenkins CLI的命令中都包含某种格式的前导码（preamble），前导码格式通常为：<===[JENKINS REMOTING CAPACITY]===>rO0ABXNyABpodWRzb24ucmVtb3RpbmcuQ2FwYWJpbGl0eQAAAAAAAAABAgABSgAEbWFza3hwAAAAAAAAAH4=, 该前导码包含一个经过base64编码的序列化对象。“Capability”类型的序列化对象的功能是告诉服务器客户端具备哪些具体功能（比如HTTP分块编码功能）。

最后调用makeTransport()方法返回CommandTransport对象, 根据cap是否支持Chunking返回不同的对象ChunkedCommandTransport或ClassicCommandTransport。

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protected CommandTransport makeTransport(InputStream is, OutputStream os, Mode mode, Capability cap) throws IOException {
    FlightRecorderInputStream fis = new FlightRecorderInputStream(is);

    if (cap.supportsChunking())
        return new ChunkedCommandTransport(cap, mode.wrap(fis), mode.wrap(os), os);
    else {
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(mode.wrap(os));
        oos.flush();    // make sure that stream preamble is sent to the other end. avoids dead-lock

        return new ClassicCommandTransport(
                new ObjectInputStreamEx(mode.wrap(fis),getBaseLoader(),getClassFilter()),
                oos,fis,os,cap);
    }
}

利用SSD的PoC脚本发送的upload请求返回的是ClassicCommandTransport对象，其继承关系如下图所示。

Channel构造函数Channel(ChannelBuilder settings, CommandTransport transport)中, transport.setup()调用SynchronousCommandTransport类的setup()方法来启动一个ReaderThread线程。

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public void setup(Channel channel, CommandReceiver receiver) {
       this.channel = channel;
       new ReaderThread(receiver).start();
   }

读取Command对象

通过上面的ReaderThread.start()方法启动一个线程，ReaderThread为SynchronousCommandTransport类的内部类，在run()方法中，调用ClassicCommandTransport类的read()方法读取输入，read()方法实际是调用Command类的readFrom()方法读取，通过反序列化输入返回一个Command对象。

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private final class ReaderThread extends Thread {
        ......
        public ReaderThread(CommandReceiver receiver) {
            super("Channel reader thread: "+channel.getName());
            this.receiver = receiver;
        }

        @Override
        public void run() {
            final String name =channel.getName();
            try {
                while(!channel.isInClosed()) {
                    Command cmd = null;
                    try {
                        cmd = read();
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public final Command read() throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
      try {
          Command cmd = Command.readFrom(channel, ois);

在反序列化输入返回一个Command对象时就执行了cmd命令，而不是通过正常的回调handle()方法执行cmd命令，反序列化导致的执行代码触发的相关异常如下:

类型转换异常ClassCastException: org.apache.commons.collections.map.ReferenceMap cannot be cast to hudson.remoting.Command.

正常执行Command

虽说反序列化时就执行了cmd代码，这里也顺带了解下正常的执行cmd的过程。SynchronousCommandTransport类的run()方法中，获得返回的Command对象(cmd)，然后调用receiver.handle(cmd);处理命令，其实质是回调Channel类构造方法里面的handle方法，而传入handle方法的cmd参数就是反序列化得到的Command对象。

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transport.setup(this, new CommandReceiver() {
            public void handle(Command cmd) {
                ......
                try {
                    cmd.execute(Channel.this);

绕过黑名单保护机制

上面过程主要讲述的是漏洞触发的流程，而该漏洞的核心是反序列化Java SignedObject对象会绕过黑名单保护机制，从而导致的代码执行漏洞。

ClassFilter类定义的默认的黑名单如下：

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private static final String[] DEFAULT_PATTERNS = {
        "^bsh[.].*",
        "^com[.]google[.]inject[.].*",
        "^com[.]mchange[.]v2[.]c3p0[.].*",
        "^com[.]sun[.]jndi[.].*",
        "^com[.]sun[.]corba[.].*",
        "^com[.]sun[.]javafx[.].*",
        "^com[.]sun[.]org[.]apache[.]regex[.]internal[.].*",
        "^java[.]awt[.].*",
        "^java[.]rmi[.].*",
        "^javax[.]management[.].*",
        "^javax[.]naming[.].*",
        "^javax[.]script[.].*",
        "^javax[.]swing[.].*",
        "^org[.]apache[.]commons[.]beanutils[.].*",
        "^org[.]apache[.]commons[.]collections[.]functors[.].*",
        "^org[.]apache[.]myfaces[.].*",
        "^org[.]apache[.]wicket[.].*",
        ".*org[.]apache[.]xalan.*",
        "^org[.]codehaus[.]groovy[.]runtime[.].*",
        "^org[.]hibernate[.].*",
        "^org[.]python[.].*",
        "^org[.]springframework[.](?!(\\p{Alnum}+[.])*\\p{Alnum}*Exception$).*",
        "^sun[.]rmi[.].*",
        "^javax[.]imageio[.].*",
        "^java[.]util[.]ServiceLoader$",
        "^java[.]net[.]URLClassLoader$"
    };

黑名单机制绕过可以通过分析补丁得到印证。

参考